



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

book has been subjected has resulted in greater accuracy and, in many instances, in a more condensed form of statement, but without any loss of clearness and lucidity. The principal improvements noted are the fuller (but not too full) citation of authorities, with the titles of the cases and the full table of abbreviations printed as an appendix. The only omission which we notice is that of the useful bibliography of domestic and foreign law dictionaries prefixed to the first edition. In only a few instances has the author failed to define a term or phrase listed (as in *Falsifying a Record*), or contented himself with a foreign phrase without giving or noting the form which it assumes in our law (as the French "*Flagrant Delit*" without mention of *In Flagrante Delicto*). He has, however, in too many instances failed to account for an unusual term by giving a reference to an instance of its use, though it must be admitted that this would often be impossible. The general substitution of references to authorities for those to previous lexicographers would be a great improvement, but probably also a task approaching the impossible. But these are counsels of perfection and do not affect the substantial merits of an excellent work of reference.

G. W. K.

THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF LAW OR THE ETHICAL BASIS OF JURISPRUDENCE. By WILLIAM S. PATTEE, LL. D. Chicago. CALLAGHAN & Co. 1909. pp. xxv, 264.

This little work belongs to a class which is scarcely represented in our Anglo-American legal literature, though our English brethren need go no farther than Scotland to find a soil, nourished by Continental ideas, which has proved congenial to its growth. Germany is, of course, its favorite habitat and there it has long flourished, to the advantage of German law. It must be said that our American law is not likely to be much benefited by Doctor Pattee's learned work. This is not because our lawyers and our law have no need of guidance and support from ethical principles, but rather by reason of the fact that the ethics of our author belong to an order of ideas which is passing away and which has long ceased to exercise any appreciable influence on legal thought. As an intuitionist he can have no sympathy with the newer thought which sees ethics not as a system, actual or potential, but as the progressive movement of a given society in the field of conduct. Hence justice is to him something immutable, absolute, not the progressive adaptation of social conduct to changing social ideals. His masters are not Hegel, Sidgwick, Green, and Dewey, but Kant, Leibnitz, McCosh, and Harris, especially Harris, whose "Philosophical Basis of Theism" and "Self Revelation of God" furnish the philosophical foundations of the work.

Apart from this there is little but good to be said of the book. It is profound without being obscure and bears evidence of wide reading and reflection. Only a few of its pages are devoted to "Human Law" and still fewer to positive law. But as the purpose of the book is not to develop a system of jurisprudence from ethical conceptions but to lay down the moral principles upon which law must ultimately rest, this cannot be accounted a defect in a work of more than ordinary interest and merit.

G. W. K.